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Louis Rambo is a partner in the Corporate Department and a member of the Capital Markets Group. He focuses his practice on counseling public companies and their boards of directors on corporate governance, capital markets transactions, mergers and acquisitions, securities regulation, disclosure and shareholder activism. Drawing on his previous tenure with the Securities and Exchange Commission in the Division of Corporation Finance, Louis partners with clients on capital raising, including underwritten equity transactions, at-the-market offerings and high-yield and investment grade debt offerings, as well as on structuring M&A transactions, spin-offs, tender offers and going private transactions. He advises public companies on developing governance and disclosure matters, including director independence, compensation, insider trading issues, shareholder proposals and stockholder meetings, and advises on shareholder activism and takeover defense.

Louis also regularly advises hedge funds, private equity funds, family offices, private companies and other financial institutions on a wide range of transactional and securities regulatory compliance matters, including capital raising, PIPEs and secondary transactions, novel and complex beneficial ownership issues arising under the federal securities laws, derivative transactions, insider trading issues and policies and compliance programs.

Louis previously served as an attorney with the SEC in the Division of Corporation Finance. While at the SEC, Louis worked on a number of transactional and securities compliance matters.

A potentially overlooked but important issue that public companies should have in mind when granting option or option-like awards is avoiding the unintentional appearance of “spring-loading” and “bullet-dodging,” both of which have been a recent focus of the SEC and shareholders and viewed as potentially poor corporate governance practices.

“Spring-loading” is when a public company grants option or option-like awards shortly before the release of positive material nonpublic information, which is expected to increase the company’s stock price. The grantee of a spring-loaded award immediately benefits from the increase in the stock price. For example, if stock options are granted with an exercise price of $10 per share before market trading, and a positive earnings release causes the stock price to close the same day at $15 per share, each option would already be $5 in-the-money.

The converse of spring-loading is “bullet-dodging,” which is when a public company grants option or option-like awards shortly after the release of negative material nonpublic information, which is expected to decrease the company’s stock price. Again, the grantee immediately benefits from the decrease in the stock price. For example, if stock options are scheduled to be granted before market trading with an exercise price of $15 per share, but the grant is made after a negative earnings release, or more significantly if it is delayed until after the negative earnings release, and the stock price has since closed at $10 per share, the company would have avoided granting options that would each be $5 out-of-the-money.